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PRESERVING PROCESS IN THE WAKE OF POLICY:




Archbishop Oscar Romero once said, "If there were love of neighbor
there would be no terrorism, no repression, no selfishness, none of such
cruel inequalities in society, no abductions, no crimes." I Unfortunately,
history shows that systemic ignorance, suspicion, and greed act as barriers
to solidarity and truth. Peoples and nations continually struggle with
identity and social organization-often translating into injustice. In the
wake of modernity and liberal democracy, seemingly atomistic individu-
als struggle to identify with a greater social or national community. Per-
haps one of the most practical and uncontroversial ways humanity
subdivides itself is through national citizenship.
Citizenship, however, is more than simply a passport or postal
address. Citizenship requires a constructed sense of nationalism some-
how that sets countries apart. A common device used to distinguish
national cultures is the creation of a "threat" to that culture. Examples
throughout history reveal that for every set of constructed values, there
exists an alternate set of values endangering the legitimacy of the major-
ity. In order to maintain a certain worldview, nations repeatedly go
through an often violent cleansing process to strengthen and unite the
community. The ancient Romans massacred Christians, Christians mas-
sacred Moors, the Puritans had witches, the Nazis Jews, capitalists com-
munists, and so forth. Especially when groups or governments perceive a
threat to be internal or subversive, significant efforts are made to preserve
the status quo.
Since its founding, the United States has intentionally excluded or
deported noncitizens who "threaten" American society. Practical realities
make such decisions necessary. The danger of these decisions lies not in
the categorization of individuals, but in the subordination of basic
human dignity to such categories. As the United States increasingly per-
ceives immigration as dangerous, society is more willing to commit or
allow unjust acts to occur against noncitizens.
* B.A. in Political Science, Theology Minor, Boston College, magna cum laude,
2005; Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2009.
1. OscAR ROMERO, Homily of Sept. 10, 1978, in THE VIOLENCE OF LOVE 102
(James R. Brockman, S.J. ed. & trans., Plough Publishing 2007).
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The fear created after the terrorist attacks in Oklahoma City, New
York City, and Washington D.C. legitimized unjust procedures in Amer-
ican immigration law. As immigrants became increasingly categorized as
national security threats or criminals, they became increasingly vulnerable
to harsh immigration policies. Despite this trend, procedural protections
have become weaker, leaving many innocent noncitizens defenseless. At
the very least, noncitizens should be guaranteed a right to present their
case in a meaningful and fair way.
Particularly since September 11, 2001, trauma and fear have
become foundational elements of American immigration policy.
Although national security and general crime control are obviously vital
national interests, policymakers must be cautious not to use fear as a
justification for dehumanization and injustice in the immigration con-
text. Although expanding the grounds for deportation may be necessary
to ensure safety, higher stakes require higher procedural protections.
Without adequate safeguards-such as an absolute right to appointed
counsel for indigent noncitizens-the risk of injustice is simply too high.
This Note explores the current need for a categorical right to
appointed counsel under the Fifth Amendment in removal proceedings.2
Part I explains the existing statutory and constitutional right to counsel
in removal proceedings and how current laws and precedents do not pro-
tect indigent noncitizens. Part II discusses how terrorist acts over the
past fifteen years have distorted immigration policy, allowing national
security and crime-control issues to dominate debate. Part III tracks
immigration law over the same time period, showing the increased sever-
ity and complexity of removal proceedings. Part IV argues that this
increase in severity demands an equivalent increase in procedural due
process protection. Finally, Part V reasons that a categorical right to
appointed counsel is not only legally justified, but also cost-effective,
morally right, and central to American principles.
I. EXISTING PROCEDURAL RIGHTS Do NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT
INDIGENT NONCITIZENS
A. Complicated Removal Proceedings Demand Legal Representation for
Noncitizens
Removal proceedings are complicated and often terrifying for
noncitizens faced with potential banishment from home and family. The
majority of indigent noncitizens are expected to navigate the immigra-
2. After the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), the term
"removal" refers to both "exclusion proceedings" (removing a noncitizen not formally
admitted to the United States) and "deportation proceedings" (removing a noncitizen
after a formal admission). For the purposes of this Note, removal proceedings refer only
to deportation proceedings.
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tion system without any legal training and often in a language not their
own. 3
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiates removal
proceedings by issuing a "Notice to Appear" which states specific charges
"against the alien" as well as "the statutory provisions alleged to have
been violated."'4 After a noncitizen receives a "Notice to Appear," they
can either challenge the grounds for the deportation itself or apply for
statutory relief.5 During the adversarial hearing, an attorney employed
by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) presents
the government's case in front of an immigration judge employed by the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).6 Although a nonci-
tizen has a right to present evidence and rebut the government's evi-
dence, 7 an unrepresented noncitizen is unlikely to know what specific
elements need to be proven in order to avoid deportation.8 There are
several forms of relief if the noncitizen can meet certain statutory crite-
ria.9 Such criteria, however, are often ambiguous and difficult for even
trained immigration lawyers to comprehend.' ° If the record does not
indicate that a noncitizen may be eligible for some form of relief, the
immigration judge has no responsibility to inform the noncitizen that
such relief may be available."
Furthermore, there is little opportunity for meaningful judicial
review of immigration court orders. In 2002, Attorney General John
Ashcroft issued new rules for judicial review which restricted the Board
of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) review of immigration judges' factual
findings, shortened the preparation time for appellate briefs and tran-
3. Beth J. Werlin, Note, Renewing the Call: Immigrants' Right to Appointed Counsel
in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393, 393-94 (2000).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act § 239(a)(1)(D); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(a)(1)(D)
(West 2006).
5. Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, INSIGHT [MIGRA-
TION POLICY INSTITUTE], Apr. 2005, at 1, 1-2.
6. The EOIR is a division of the U.S. Justice Department. See U.S. Dep't of
Justice, DOJ Agencies, http://www.usdoj.gov/02organizations/02_1.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009).
7. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B) ("[Tihe alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien's own behalf, and
to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government but these rights shall not entitle
the alien to examine such national security information as the Government may
proffer.").
8. Werlin, supra note 3, at 394.
9. David A. Robertson, Comment, An Opportunity to be Heard: The Right to
Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1022 (1988).
10. See INA § 240A(b)(1)(B) (stating that the Department of Homeland Security
may cancel removal if the noncitizen, among other criteria, "has been a person of good
moral character"). Such language is virtually meaningless to noncitizens unfamiliar with
immigration law.
11. Moran-Enriquez v. INS, 884 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1989).
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scripts, reduced the BIA from twenty-three judges to eleven, and
expanded the use of one-member decisions issued without a reasoned,
written opinion. 2 After an immigration judge orders the removal of a
noncitizen, the noncitizen must file a "Notice to Appeal" within thirty
days. 13 This form is only six pages long, consisting of general instruc-
tions and fill-in-the-blank questions.' 4 Despite the seemingly basic
nature of the form, a BIA member-often before any briefs have been
filed or any transcripts have been prepared-may enter a "summary dis-
missal" if the noncitizen does not meet any number of legally complex
conditions.' 5 If a noncitizen is not represented by counsel, surviving
summary dismissal is difficult.1"
If a BIA member does not summarily dismiss the noncitizen's
appeal, the member must decide the case alone unless one of six enumer-
ated situations apply. 17 This standard is high and drastically limits a
noncitizen's access to a three-member panel.18 Again, knowing and
understanding such a threshold is near impossible without representa-
tion. Even if an appeal does warrant a three-member panel, the panel
may still issue a summary dismissal.' 9 One study revealed that over half
of all BIA decisions were issued without a written opinion, and members
decided up to fifty cases in one day.20 Several federal circuit courts have
criticized BIA practices.2
12. See 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002); 67 id. 54,903-04 (Aug. 26, 2002)
(amending 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1).
13. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b).
14. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., Notice of Appeal From a
Decision of an Immigration Judge, OMB No. 1125-0002, Form EOIR-26 (Dec. 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir26.pdf.
15. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (d)(2) (basis for summary dismissal includes appeals that
lack adequate reasons for appeal, appeals filed for improper purposes, appeals filed with
intention to file a brief but failure to do so, appeals outside BIA jurisdiction, appeals that
are untimely, and other miscellaneous reasons).
16. See Werlin, supra note 3, at 417-24 (summarizing "presentation and proce-
dure" challenges to noncitizens).
17. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(i)-(vi). The six enumerated situations are incon-
sistent rulings among immigration judges, need for a precedential decision, a decision not
in conformity with the law, a major national impact, clearly erroneous factual findings,
and the need to reverse. A BIA member is prohibited from writing an opinion if
affirming a lower court decision and either the issues are controlled by precedent or are
not so substantial as to warrant an opinion. Id. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(A)-(B).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1003.1(d)(2).
20. Jonathan Peterson & Lisa Getter, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2003, at Al.
21. See, e.g., Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005)
(characterizing the immigration judge's opinion as incoherent and criticizing the BIA for
affirming without opinion); lao [sic) v.Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2005)
(stating that the immigration judge's opinion contained errors of fact and logic and criti-
cizing the BIA for affirming with a "short, unhelpful, boilerplate opinion").
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Once a noncitizen has exhausted all of their administrative reme-
dies, he or she may file a petition for review in the federal courts of
appeal.22 If a noncitizen does not file a brief within forty days of the
administrative record becoming available, the court must dismiss the case
"unless a manifest injustice would result. ' 23  Immigration legislation
passed in 1996 limited judicial review by barring from review entire cate-
gories of removal orders, most denials of discretionary relief, and other
judicial remedies.24 Such limitations have heightened the importance of
initial argument before an immigration judge. Without representation-
and particularly when a noncitizen does not speak English-a noncitizen
is unlikely to understand the ultimate implication of their initial actions.
In 2006, 65% of all completed cases in immigration court involved
noncitizens without legal representation.25 Between 2001 and 2006, the
number of unrepresented noncitizens increased by 84,410 people despite
a significantly less dramatic increase in cases.26 The EOIR's 2006 Statis-
tical Yearbook stated:
Of great concern to EOIR is the large number of individuals
appearing pro se. Immigration Judges, in order to ensure that such
individuals understand the nature of the proceedings, as well as
their rights and responsibilities, must take extra care and spend
additional time explaining this information.27
However, given the overcrowded dockets of immigration courts, it
is unlikely immigration judges can adequately assure that noncitizens
understand the complicated immigration process.28
As the number of unrepresented noncitizens increases, the number
of appeals filed with the BIA has decreased.29 In 2006, noncitizens
appealed only 9% of all immigration judge decisions. 3' Furthermore, a
2004 study showed that the EOIR approved 39% of represented, non-
detained asylum seekers, but only 14% of unrepresented, non-detained
22. INA § 242(a)(1); see also id. § 242(b)(2) (noncitizen files a petition for review
in the appellate circuit where their removal hearing was held).
23. Id. § 242(b)(3)(C).
24. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 728
(4th ed. 2005).
25. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2006 STATISTI-
CAL YEAR BOOK, at G1 fig.9 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy06syb.pdf [hereinafter EOIR 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK].
26. Id; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2005 STA-
TISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at Gl fig.9 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/stat-
spub/fy05syb.pdf [hereinafter EOIR 2005 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK].
27. EOIR 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 25, at GI.
28. See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Thousands ofArabs and Muslims Could Be Deported,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at Al.
29. EOIR 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 25, at Yl fig.32.
30. Id.
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asylum seekers. 31 For represented and unrepresented detained asylum
seekers, the approval rates were 18% and 3% respectively. 32 Although
these drastic differences in approval rates do not necessarily indicate erro-
neous results, the correlation between representation and success cannot
be ignored.33 Particularly in asylum cases-where error can mean send-
ing a noncitizen off to be persecuted in another country-the risks
involved warrant increased procedural protection.
B. Statutory Right to Counsel Proves Illusory
Section 292 of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
states that "[i]n any removal proceedings before an immigration
judge .. .the person concerned shall have the privilege of being repre-
sented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel... as he shall
choose."'34 In general, a noncitizen receives an attorney only if he or she
can afford to hire an attorney, or if he or she can locate an attorney
willing to take his or her case pro bono.3 When a noncitizen proceeds
pro se, there must be a "knowing and voluntary waiver" of the right to
counsel.3 6 An immigration judge must "inquire specifically" as to
whether the noncitizen wishes to proceed without counsel and receive a
"voluntary affirmative response" in order for such a waiver to be valid.37
However, if a noncitizen cannot afford counsel and cannot obtain pro
bono counsel, such an inquiry is substantively meaningless.
INA § 239(b)(2) requires an immigration judge to provide a list of
available lawyers or social service organizations that are willing to
represent indigent noncitizens pro bono. 38 In 1982, however, Congress
passed the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) appropriations bill restrict-
ing federal funding for certain types of legal services provided throughout
the country.3 9 The 1982 legislation prohibited LSC beneficiary organi-
31. Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why
They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded, IMMIGR. BRIEFING, No. 04-06, at 1, 6,
11-12 (June 2004).
32. Id.
33. See Philip P. Anderson, In Defense of Detainees, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1999, at 6, 6
(citing a study of the Government Accounting Office that found that noncitizens with
legal representation have three times the chance of success as aliens without counsel).
34. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (West 2006).
35. See INA § 239(b)(1)-(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229 (West 2006).
36. Velasquez Espinosa v. INS, 404 F.2d 544, 546 (9th Cir. 1968); Tawadrus v.
Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1099, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that noncitizen silence does
not effectively waive counsel).
37. Tawadrus at 1103.
38. INA § 239(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229 (West 2006); see also INA
§ 239(a)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229 (West 2006) (stating that "a current list of counsel
prepared under subsection (b)(2)" is to be included in the Notice to Appear).
39. See Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Star. 1830, 1874-75 (1982) (limiting eligibility to
(1) Legal Permanent Residents, (2) those who have already been granted refugee or asy-
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zations from maintaining immigration practices.4" Furthermore, in
1996, Congress passed the Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and
Appropriations Act, preventing LSC beneficiary organizations from rep-
resenting most noncitizens even when all funds associated with the repre-
sentation originated from non-government sources.4 " The list provided
by immigration judges, therefore, includes significantly fewer organiza-
tions than it did twenty-five years ago.
In addition to prohibiting many immigration lawyers from repre-
senting noncitizens pro bono, the government also maintains the power
to transfer detained noncitizens to remote holding facilities-often in
rural communities-where legal aid simply does not exist.42 Therefore,
an indigent noncitizen's statutory right to counsel is illusory at best since
the government effectively limits the number of available lawyers.
Although government violations of a noncitizen's statutory right to
counsel have been found in a small number of cases, 43 the level of gov-
ernment impediment must be exceptionally high for a noncitizen to pre-
vail. 44 Even if the government does violate a noncitizen's statutory right
to counsel, many courts impose an additional prejudice requirement that
effectively cures the violation.4 5 For the government to violate a nonci-
tizen's statutory right to counsel, a noncitizen must already have an attor-
ney or have the ability to obtain one.4 6 The court then determines
whether the government acted in such a way that it prevented the nonci-
lum status, (3) those with a specified relationship to a U.S. citizen, (4) those who have
already applied for adjustment of status, and (5) those who have not yet been rejected).
40. Robert L. Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for Impov-
erished Immigrants, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 641-45 (1994).
41. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 504(a) (1996).
42. See Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1256
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 806 (1995) (although noncitizen transferred over
1,000 miles away from family, friends, and employer, arbitrary change of venue for
deportation hearing did not violate statutory or constitutional rights).
43. See, e.g., Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (statutory
right to counsel violated when judge barred noncitizen's counsel from courtroom after
refusing to consolidate cases); Campos v. Nail, 43 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1994)
(statutory right to counsel violated by denying motion to change venue to obtain coun-
sel); Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985) (statutory right to counsel
violated by granting inadequate continuance).
44. See, e.g., Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 375 (3d Cir. 2003) (judge
did not abuse discretion and, therefore, did not violate noncitizen's statutory right to
counsel despite denying a continuance to obtain representation).
45. See Baltazar-Alcazar, 386 F.3d at 947 n.6 (noting that the 7th, 2d, and D.C.
Circuits do not require prejudice. 5th, 4th, and 10th Circuits do require prejudice. 9th
and 3d Circuits have yet to decide the question.).
46. Kerwin, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that in most cases indigent noncitizens
cannot secure counsel at all, making their statutory right to counsel ineffectual).
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tizen from gaining the benefits of counsel, and if so, whether such an
action made a difference in the outcome.
47
Violation of a noncitizen's statutory right to counsel could also
occur in cases where the noncitizen was not properly informed of his or
her right to counsel or the complexity of his or her case. 41 In essence,
once a noncitizen has been informed of his or her rights-often in a
foreign language-the INA does not require the government to provide
counsel.
C. Constitutional Right to Counsel is Weak
In addition to a statutory right to counsel, a noncitizen also has a
constitutional right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment in deporta-
tion/removal proceedings.49 However, no Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel exists since deportation/removal proceedings are
deemed civil and not criminal in nature. 50 The traditional civil-criminal
distinction-and therefore the distinction between Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protection-centers on whether removal is a "punishment"
or simply a legal determination of status resulting from statutory condi-
tions placed on a noncitizen. 5 1 The Fifth Amendment states, "No per-
son shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
47. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 564 (9th Cir. 1990)
(detaining noncitizen far away from potential and existing counsel violated noncitizen's
right to counsel). But see Gandarillas-Zambrana, 44 F.3d at 1256 (holding that "statu-
tory privilege of legal representation" does not include right to be detained where ability
to obtain representation is greatest).
48. See Reyes-Palacios v. INS, 836 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988) (given com-
plexity of asylum case, immigration judge should have asked noncitizen if he wished to be
represented); Partible v. INS, 600 F.2d 1094, 1096 (5th Cir. 1979) (although immigra-
tion judge informed noncitizen of statutory right to counsel, noncitizen waived right
without any understanding of the complexity of the case or arguments that could be
made on her behalf).
49. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903)
("[T]his court has never held ... that administrative officers, when executing the provi-
sions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental princi-
ples that inhere in 'due process of law' as understood at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution."). In practice, however, procedural due process rights were minimal before
the 1952 INA. See, e.g., id. at 101-02 (due process does not require interpreter for
noncitizen).
50. See, e.g., Reyes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 2004); Michelson v.
INS, 897 F.2d 465, 467-68 (10th Cir. 1990); Mantell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 798 F.2d
124, 127 (5th Cir. 1986).
51. Compare Amanda Masters, Comment, Is Procedural Due Process in a Remote
Processing Center a Contradiction in Terms?[.] Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 999, 1011 (1996) (citing INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1994), now at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 (West 2006), which pro-
vides for deportation for multiple crimes committed once in the United States) with Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (arguing that immigration proceed-
ings are "simply the ascertainment, by appropriate and lawful means, of the fact whether
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of law."'5 2 The "touchstone" of procedural due process is "fundamental
fairness."53 Therefore, due process is an "expanding concept" as current
notions of fairness evolve.54
In the landmark 1975 case Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, a noncitizen
challenged the "at no expense to the government" clause of INA § 292 as
unconstitutional.55 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that "if procedures
mandated by Congress do not provide an alien with procedural due pro-
cess, they must yield, and the constitutional guarantee of due process
must provide adequate protection during the deportation process.
51
Appointed counsel, therefore, could have been necessary for "adequate
protection." 57 Nevertheless, the petitioner lost because he could not
establish prejudice. 58 The court-looking only at the record before it-
concluded that no defense was available and, therefore, no lawyer could
have made a difference. 59 Aguilera-Enriquez established a case-by-case
test for whether the government must provide counsel for indigent
noncitizens.6 ° Ironically, by adopting a case-by-case approach instead of
a categorical per se rule, a noncitizen is required to make legally nuanced
arguments in order to obtain appointed counsel. In other words, a
noncitizen needs a lawyer to get a lawyer. Unless the court finds a
unique assault on "fundamental fairness," a noncitizen's inability to pay
an attorney does not offend their Fifth Amendment rights.
61
Judge DeMascio's dissent in Aguilera-Enriquez recognized the inher-
ent flaws in the majority's opinion. First, Judge DeMascio appreciated
that "deportation is punishment, pure and simple." 62 For the govern-
ment to unilaterally banish a legal permanent resident without so much
as appointing counsel is "unconscionable." 6 3 Second, Judge DeMascio
realized that a case-by-case approach with a prejudice element requires a
retrospective appeals process where the court speculates on "what conten-
the conditions exist upon which [C]ongress has enacted that an alien of this class may
remain within the country").
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
54. Charles Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L.
REV. 875, 879 (1961).
55. 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
56. Id. at 568 (citing Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100).
57. Id.
58. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 568-69.
59. Id. But see Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1975)
(criticizing harmless error rule, stating it should not negate the "fundamental ... right" of
being represented in deportation proceedings).
60. Such analysis involves balancing factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 177-82.
61. Kerwin, supra note 5, at 8.
62. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 572 (DeMascio, J., dissenting).
63. Id
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tions appointed counsel could have raised."6 4 Such a system cannot
assure due process of law.
The essential difference between Aguilera-Enriquez's majority opin-
ion and its dissent is the different characterization of what it means to be
deported. The majority stated that although deportation is "drastic" and
"at times the equivalent of banishment or exile," it is "not penal in char-
acter."6 5 The dissent, on the other hand, contended that "[e]xpulsion is
such lasting punishment that meaningful due process can require no
less."
'66
The right to appointed counsel depends on this distinction. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court extended a Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel in all criminal cases-including state cases-
via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 Realizing
the punitive nature of a criminal conviction, the court reasoned, "With-
out [legal counsel], though [the accused] be not guilty, he faces the dan-
ger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence." 68 As the court recognized, this risk of punishing innocent
people strikes at the core of "fundamental fairness" under the Fifth (and
Fourteenth) Amendment. If deportation can be characterized as an even
more dangerous and lasting penalty for often technical violations,
Gideon's reasoning suggests that noncitizens should at the very least be
afforded the right to establish their innocence.
In In re Gault, the Supreme Court extended a categorical right to
appointed counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause in civil juvenile delinquency cases.6 9 The court reasoned that
juveniles-who cannot be expected to understand the complicated and
technical nature of the judicial proceeding 7 -"need[ ] the assistance of
counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain
whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it."7 1 Even though
64. Id. at 573.
65. Id. at 568.
66. Id. at 572.
67. 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). The Fourteenth Amendment contains a parallel
due process clause to the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
68. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69
(1932)).
69. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) ("We conclude that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delin-
quency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's free-
dom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that
counsel will be appointed to represent the child.").
70. Id. at 39 n.65.
71. Id. at 36.
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such proceedings are deemed civil, the "awesome prospect" of separating
the youth from his or her family and restricting the youth's freedom
justifies the assurance of counsel for indigent individuals. 72 Under the
same reasoning, a right to appointed counsel should apply to noncitizens
in immigration court.
In the immigration context, a Fifth Amendment right to appointed
counsel has not been established because removal proceedings are charac-
terized as non-punitive and, therefore, civil. In general, courts will defer
to the statute at issue in order to determine whether a sanction is civil or
criminal. 73 If Congress passes a statute that is designed to regulate activ-
ity in order to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose, 74 it will be
deemed non-punitive and free from the "cumbersome baggage" of crimi-
nal procedure. 75 Unless the statute is "so punitive either in purpose or
effect," the courts will defer to Congress in regards to whether the sanc-
tion triggers certain constitutional protections.
76
Since immigration statutes traditionally serve a rational remedial
purpose, most courts will not extend constitutional safeguards to those
facing deportation beyond minimal procedural rights. 77  However,
many-including members of the Supreme Court-argue that private
interests at stake in deportation proceedings compare to the gravity of
72. Id.
73. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (holding that a fine
imposed for emitting hazardous materials was civil, not criminal, because of statutory
label).
74. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363
(1984).
75. Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of
the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 309
(2000) (quoting Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinc-
tion, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1330 (1991)).
76. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), the Court
articulates relevant factors for when a Congressional label can be overridden. The Court
includes
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
77. Pauw, supra note 75, at 309; Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903)
(holding that Fifth Amendment due process protections apply to noncitizens in deporta-
tion hearings).
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criminal punishment particularly when families are divided, property is
lost, and the noncitizen is banished to a country no longer familiar.
78
D. Political Implications of Extending Procedural Rights Limit
Legislative Action
For over a century, it has been established law that the U.S. Consti-
tution greatly restricts the courts from interfering with Congressional or
Executive immigration policy. 79 This is problematic in immigration law
since it means that procedural protection for noncitizens is subject to
political pressure.8" Similar to the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s,
many politicians are reluctant to act because they fear upsetting their
constituencies over such controversial and emotional topics.
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Fong Yue Ting v. United
States in 1893, Congress has enjoyed nearly unfettered power to deport
all noncitizens it fears "will corrupt the manners of the citizens[,] ...
create religious disturbances, or occasion any other disorder, contrary to
the public safety."'" This power is founded on the maxim that every
sovereign nation, in the interest of self-preservation, must be able to regu-
late who enters and remains within its borders.8 2 Because this basic prin-
ciple of international law affects foreign relations, only the political
departments of the government have the authority to make such
determinations.
8 3
By this reasoning, it could seem logical that noncitizens do not
deserve increased procedural rights. The Court in Ting reasoned that
deportation is not punishment "but a method of enforcing the return to
his own country of [one] who has not complied with the conditions" on
which the government "has determined that his continuing to reside [in
the United States] shall depend."84 The Court concluded that constitu-
tional rights that apply in the criminal context such as trial by jury, the
limit on unreasonable search and seizure, and protection from cruel and
unusual punishment "have no application" to noncitizens.85 Even in
1893, however, certain members of the Court found such logic flawed.
In his dissent, Justice Brewer railed, "Deportation is punishment. It
78. See, e.g., Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963)
("[D]eportation is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families.");
Pauw, supra note 75, at 337-45.
79. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legis-
lative power of Congress more complete.")).
80. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Sur-
rogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1656-57 (1992).
81. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 731.
84. Id. at 730.
85. Id.
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involves-First, an arrest, a deprival of liberty; and, second, a removal
from home, from family, from business, from property. ' '86 Quoting
President James Madison, Justice Brewer continued, "[I]f a banishment
of this sort be not a punishment .. . it will be difficult to imagine a
doom to which the name can be applied." 87 Justice Brewer did not argue
that constitutional due process restricts Congress from deporting anyone
they please, but rather that the stakes are high enough to warrant a trial
with constitutional protections.
Until the 1980s, procedural due process for noncitizens was guided
by the maxim: "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." 88 However, the
Supreme Court's 1982 decision Landon v. Plasencia held that courts
could extend constitutional due process rights to noncitizens in deporta-
tion proceedings based on a case-by-case balancing test.8 9 Nevertheless,
the Court acknowledged that "we have only rarely held that the proce-
dures provided by the executive were inadequate." '9 In the 1993 case
Reno v. Flores, the Court interpreted away a procedural due process claim,
reasoning, "Congress has given the Attorney General broad discretion to
determine whether, and on what terms, an alien arrested on suspicion of
being deportable should be released pending the deportation hearing."'
This near-plenary power of Congress to define procedural due pro-
cess for noncitizens creates a problematic catch-22. Congress will not
ease immigration policy because of political pressure, yet courts are reluc-
tant to recognize due process rights not defined by Congress. However,
given the precedent of Plasencia, the courts have an opportunity to
extend procedural due process rights in order to achieve fundamental
fairness.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS DISTORT
IMMIGRATION DEBATE
Due largely in part to the terrorist attacks of the mid-1990s and the
cultural trauma of September 11, 2001, immigration policy is no longer
a civil concern charged with evaluating the status of foreign individuals.
92
Rather, current immigration policy reflects an attitude that immigrants
86. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 741. Justice Brewer also makes a prophetic, although deplorably racist,
statement, stating, "It is true this statute is directed only against the obnoxious Chinese;
but, if the power exists, who shall say it will not be exercised to-morrow against other
classes and other people?" Id. at 743.
88. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
89. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982).
90. Id. at 33.
91. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1993).
92. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 ("[The deportation process] is in no proper
sense a trial and sentence for a crime or offense. It is simply the ascertainment, by appro-
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threaten the physical and economic safety of citizens. 93 This "national
security" element to immigration law encourages the mentality that
immigrants threaten American society and therefore should be punished
for any wrongdoing. In order to deal with America's post-September
11 th vulnerability, policymakers have defined a one-dimensional battle
between "us" and "them." '9 4
National security has always been a legitimate ground to remove a
noncitizen.95 The INA defines "National Security" broadly to include
"national defense, foreign relations, or [the] economic interests of the
United States." '9 6 Whenever Congress legislates in regards to national
security, the courts are particularly reluctant to review legislative and
executive action. 9' As stated above, it is well established that "[t]he
power to exclude or expel aliens, being a power affecting international
relations, is vested in the political departments of the government." '98
Concededly, it is imperative that the President be able to direct foreign
relations and defend the nation with one voice. 99 However, as political
rhetoric and federal legislation increasingly characterize immigration pol-
icy as national security policy, noncitizens become vulnerable to mob
mentalities of fear. This reality demands an increase in procedural due
process rights including a categorical right to appointed counsel.
National rhetoric aimed at restoring a sense of security increasingly
combines immigration, crime, and terrorism into one imprecise con-
priate and lawful means, of the fact whether the conditions exist upon which [C]ongress
has enacted that an alien of this class may remain within the country.").
93. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs, Lou Dobbs: Beware the Lame Duck, CNN.coM, Oct. 17,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/10/16/Dobbs.OctI7/index.html?iref=newssearch
("[The Bush] administration has permitted American businesses to hire illegal aliens,
encouraged the invasion of 12 million to 20 million illegal aliens and has given Mexico
and corporate America dominion over our borders and our immigration policy .... The
assault on our national sovereignty continues.").
94. Roberto Rodriguez, Without Mexicans, Who Would Americans Blame for Their
Country's Problems?: Us vs. Them in the Immigration Debate, COUNTERPUNCH MAG.,
May 25, 2007, http://www.counterpunch.org/rodriguez05252007.html.
95. See, e.g., The Alien Enemy Act of 1789, 50 U.S.C.A. § 21-24 (West 2006)
(applicable during formal declarations of war); An Act to Regulate the Immigration of
Aliens in the United States, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, 1221 (1903) (power to remove those
who believe in, or advocate for, the forceful overthrow of the U.S. government); Subver-
sive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Star. 987, 1006 (excluding Communist Party
members); INA § 212(a)(3)(A)-(B).
96. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(d)(2) (West 2006); see also Donald Kerwin & Margaret D.
Stock, National Security and Immigration Policy: Reclaiming Terms, Measuring Success, and
Setting Priorities, COMBATING TERRORIST CTR., 6-7 (2006), available at http://www.
cliniclegal.org/Publications/ArticlesbyCLINIC/NationalSecurity-and-Immigration-
Policy.pdf.
97. See Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186, 210-17 (1962) (defining political question
doctrine of non-review).
98. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713.
99. Carr, 369 U.S. at 281 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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cept. 1' One year after the 1992 bombing of the World Trade Center in
New York City, President Bill Clinton stated, "[W]e must not and we
will not surrender our borders to those who wish to exploit our history of
compassion and justice. We cannot ... allow our people to be endan-
gered by those who would enter our country to terrorize Americans."' 1
Almost naturally, Clinton blends notions of immigration and security,
tempering "compassion and justice" in the interest of protecting domes-
tic wellbeing. Although Clinton's statement is appealing-no citizen
would want people to enter the country for the sole purpose of terror-
izing Americans-it represents a dangerous association between immigra-
tion and national security policy. Crimes committed by noncitizens,
domestic threats of terrorism, and immigration should not be "subsumed
under the broad rubric of national security threats.""0 2 As more Ameri-
cans view immigrants as a threat to internal peace and safety, citizens are
more likely to suspend basic civil and human rights out of an "otherwise
heroic and blameless national mission."' 1 3 Under this membership the-
ory, vulnerable Americans will err on the side of deporting innocent
noncitizens rather than risk physical, social, or economic harm.'0 4
The traumatic events of September 11, 2001 catalyzed this national
anti-immigrant sentiment and culture of suspicion.'0 5 Sociologist Jeffrey
C. Alexander defines a "cultural trauma" as a "horrendous event that
leaves indelible marks upon [the collective's] group consciousness, mark-
ing their memories forever, and changing their future identity in funda-
mental and irrevocable ways."' 0 6 Certainly, September 1 1th fits this
definition. The sudden, intense, and dramatic images from that day
instantly provoke feelings of "violation" and "intrusion."1 7 Immediately
following the attacks, American solidarity skyrocketed.'0 8 Instinctively,
the country prepared itself to mobilize and avenge the terrorist attacks.10 9
100. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005); Securing America's Future Through Enforce-
ment Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 688, 109th Cong. (2005); Juliet Stumpf, The Crim-
migration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. REV. 367, 376
(2006).
101. Jennifer M Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Con-
trol and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1827, 1851 (2007) (quoting William Jeffer-
son Clinton, Press Conference (July 27, 1993)).
102. Id. at 1831.
103. Neil J. Smelser, September 11, 2001, as Cultural Trauma, in JEFFREY C. ALEX-
ANDER ET AL., CULTURAL TRAUMA AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 264, 272-73 (2004).
104. Stumpf, supra note 100, at 376.
105. Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration
Policy, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1173, 1176 (2004).
106. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma, in ALEXANDER ET
AL., supra note 103, at 1.
107. Smelser, supra note 103, at 266.
108. Id. at 268.
109. Id. at 269.
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The enemy, however, was ubiquitous and virtually invisible. Despite
conventional military operations in Afghanistan, many Americans-per-
haps for the first time-perceived a very real domestic threat of terrorism.
It was not lost on Americans that the terrorists had entered the United
States legally, taken flight lessons in the Midwest, and slept comfortably
in a Boston hotel before that fateful morning."' Combined with the
country's vengeful energy, policymakers became armed with the political
capital to "sanitize" the country."'
Immediately after the 2001 attacks, between 1,200 and 2,000 peo-
ple of Muslim, Arab, and South Asian descent were taken into custody-
many in secret with limited or no access to the outside world.'12 At least
752 of these people were charged with immigration violations.1 3 One
documented noncitizen of Pakistani descent was placed in prison after
taking a picture at a scenic overlook near the Hudson Valley." 4
Although the only charge against him was assisting an undocumented
friend find an apartment, he was held in custody for over two years
before being deported."15 The country's fear of social pollution mixed
with the court's reluctance to get involved with international politics kept
many of these removal proceedings safely within the confines of a non-
punitive civil proceeding." 6
Immigrants always bear a heavy burden when a country develops a
fear of social pollution. Three infamous examples include the Palmer
Raids of 1919, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War
II, and the prosecution of suspected communists during the Cold War.
As Neil Smelser notes, "[E]xtreme national fear and unity have always
had their darker potential-for the muting of political opposition[,] ...
scapegoating of internal minority groups thought to be dangerous or
somehow linked to the danger, and for the compromise of civil liberties
in the name of vigilance and security."' '17 The very notion of freedom
throughout America implies a lack of governmental control. This lack of
110. Richard Bernstein, Threats and Responses: Pieces of a Puzzle; On Plotters' Path
to U.S., A Stop at bin Laden Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at Al.
111. Tumlin, supra note 105, at 1176.
112. Margaret Graham Tebo, The Closing Door, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2002, at 46, 46.
113. James Ridgeway, I Hear America Sinking: Bush Pulls a Grieving Nation Into
War, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 10, 2002, at 29 (noting many detainees held on no charges at
all).
114. Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right?[] A Closer Look at the
True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 29, 29
(2003).
115. Id.
116. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) ("A deportation
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not
to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this country is
itself a crime.").
117. Smelser, supra note 103, at 270.
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control has often been a source of insecurity. Particularly when provoked
through acts of violence (e.g., anarchist riots, Pearl Harbor, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, September 11, 2001, etc.), government aggression is "jus-
tified, responsibility for it diminished, and guilt absolved.""' 8 "National
scars" are simply swept under the carpet of history.'19
When immigration is characterized as a threat rather than an Amer-
ican ideal of opportunity, innocent immigrants are persecuted for the
comfort of the majority. In 1915, at the beginning of the anarchist
movement, President Woodrow Wilson warned of "hyphenated Ameri-
cans" who "have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of
our national life. . . .Such creatures of passion, disloyalty and anarchy
must be crushed out." 120 Wilson's "poisoned blood" analogy emphasizes
the notion of an internal, deadly threat under the skin of the country.
12 1
In 1950, infamous Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy stated, "The rea-
son why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our
only powerful, potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but
rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so
well by this nation."'1 22  Similar to President Wilson, McCarthy likens
the country to an impotent man sterilized by internal infection.
Current reactions to terrorism and economic downturns echo these
historical mantras. The Department of Homeland Security in 2003
made clear that no immigrant group, "even those traditionally protected
by the U.S. immigrant policy, is immune from suspicion if it is associ-
ated, even unfairly, with al Qaeda [terrorists].' 2 3  Even if such suspi-
cions were warranted, procedural protections should have been
expanded-not contracted-so that unfair suspicion did not result in
unjust deportations.
III. RECENT LEGISLATION BLENDS NATIONAL SECURITY WITH
IMMIGRATION LAW
Since the mid-1990s, lawmakers-in response to social stigmas-
have broadened the scope and heightened the stakes for immigration
118. Id. at 272.
119. Id. at 273.
120. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERI-
cAN SOCIETY 24 (25th anniversary ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
121. Id. These sentiments translated into mass arrests-of primarily labor union
workers-and large scale deportations.
122. Sen. Joseph McCarthy, Speech on Communists in the State Department
(Feb. 9, 1950), available at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/06/docu-
ments/mccarthy/.
123. Tumlin, supra note 105, at 1190 (quoting Tom Ridge, Sec'y, Dep't of Home-
land Sec., discussing Operation Liberty Shield). For a description of the program, see
Dep't of Homeland Sec., Press Release: Operation Liberty Shield (Mar. 17, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release0 11 5.shtm.
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offenses. Despite increased severity in immigration proceedings, proce-
dural safeguards have decreased. 124 This imbalance creates a vast oppor-
tunity for injustice on the highest level.
In response to the first bombing of the World Trade Center in New
York in 1992 and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, Congress
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA). 125 Ironically, since it was sparked by the destruction of the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City-the act of a white U.S.
citizen-the AEDPA addressed immigration specifically as a central
threat to America. 26 The AEDPA expanded the definition of "terrorist
alien" while at the same time contracting procedural safeguards such as
habeas corpus review (amending INA § 106(a)). 127 Furthermore, the
AEDPA authorized the Secretary of State in consultation with what is
now the Department of Homeland Security to categorize any organiza-
tion as a "foreign terrorist organization" so long as (1) the organization is
foreign, (2) the organization engages in "terrorist activity," and (3) those
"terrorist activit[ies]" threaten the security of the United States. 128 If a
noncitizen is found to be a member of one of these "terrorist organiza-
tions," they are automatically deportable.
1 29
Even more relevant, the AEDPA combines terrorism with criminal
activity, thereby justifying the deportation of an increased number of
noncitizens.' 30  New abrogated removal procedures apply not only to
"terrorist aliens," but also to "criminal aliens." 13 ' The term "criminal
alien" is defined by vague categories such as "crimes of moral turpitude"
and "aggravated felonies"-terms of art that have significant immigration
consequences. 13 2 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) states that "[a]ny alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deport-
able."'133 This seemingly simple and automatic provision is in actuality
immensely complex. Responding to such an accusation requires a thor-
124. See supra text accompanying note 12.
125. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Star. 1214 (1996).
126. See AEDPA tit. III-IV; Jo Thomas, Starting Date Set for Trial on Oklahoma
Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at 9.
127. Chac6n, supra note 101, at 1851.
128. Id. at 1857; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(A)-(C) (West 2006).
129. Title IV dealt specifically with noncitizens suspected of terrorism. AEDPA
§ 401 lays out a precise procedure for adjudicating the deportability of suspected ter-
rorists. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 24, at 876.
130. Chac6n, supra note 101, at 1853.
131. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 442, Deportation Procedures for Certain Criminal
Aliens Who are Not Permanent Residents (1996).
132. AEDPA § 435; id. § 440(e)-(g) (adding a number of offenses to INA defini-
tion of "aggravated felon," INA § 101(a)( 4 3)).
133. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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ough analysis of what constitutes an "aggravated felony," what consti-
tutes a "conviction," and what constitutes an "admission."134
As legislation like the AEDPA expands the grounds for removal,
more noncitizens are at risk of being swept up under the increasingly
broad definitions. Such legislation exemplifies reactionary "get tough"
policies and creates a virtually automatic deportation ground void of due
process rights. For example, if noncitizens are found deportable for hav-
ing committed certain criminal offenses, the AEDPA prohibits any judi-
cial review of the order.
13 5
In addition to the AEDPA, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) the same year.'
36
Although admittedly more concerned with economics than security,
IIRIRA continued the trend of defining immigrants as dangerous and
unworthy of procedural protection. 137  Generally speaking, IIRIRA
expanded the grounds for deportation once again and abolished forms of
relief previously available. 138 IIRIRA again expanded the definition of
"aggravated felony" to include certain crimes that are only misdemeanors
under some state laws. 1 39 Penalties for low-level crimes and immigra-
tion-related offenses increased, bars to reentry heightened, mandatory
detention provisions expanded, and available public benefits
decreased.' Beginning with perceived threats of terrorism, safety issues
bled into immigration policy and transformed the removal process into a
much more intimidating experience. Two years after AEDPA and
IIRIRA, the Department of Justice claimed that the immense increase in
deportations contributed to the decline in national crime rates.14
After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the nation's collec-
tive fear and awareness of internal "social pollution" culminated in the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act).' 4 2 Although the AEDPA and IIRIRA began a general
trend of lumping national security, crime, and immigration into one
concept, September 11 th marked a fundamental shift in political rheto-
ric. What was once commonly referred to as "border control" became
"border security," symbolizing a new intimate connection with the U.S.
134. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 4 (2004) (exemplifying complexity of
"aggravated felony" analysis).
135. AEDPA § 440(a).
136. Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
137. Chac6n, supra note 101, at 1852.
138. Pauw, supra note 75, at 333-34.
139. Id. at 338-39; see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2006) (enumerating types
of aggravated felony).
140. Chac6n, supra note 101, at 1853; IIRIRA §§211-13, 301-08, 321,
501-10, 531, 551-53, 561-65, 571-77, 591-94.
141. Chac6n, supra note 101, at 1848.
142. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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War on Terror.14 3 The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of
"alien terrorist" and "terrorist activity." '144 The Act rendered removable
all aliens who "afford material support" for terrorism.' 45 Noncitizens
need not provide support to a terrorist organization designated as such by
the federal government, but any organization that has engaged in "terror-
ist activity."' 4 6 "Terrorist activity" is broadly defined as any action that
uses a "dangerous" device for anything other than "mere personal mone-
tary gain."'
47
In 2002, Congress reorganized the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) into several divisions within the newly created Department
of Homeland Security. 148 The two main divisions concerned with immi-
gration enforcement and services were called The Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) respectively. These new departments indicate the post-
September 11 th shift in terminology. What was once a "Service" under
the Department of "Justice" is now a bureau of "Enforcement" and "Pro-
tection" under the Department of "Homeland Security." Implicit in
those terms is the idea that immigration is a natural threat to America.
According to the ICE FY 2006 Annual Report, ICE was created "from
the crucible of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," and its mis-
sion is to "protect America and uphold public safety by targeting the
people, money and materials that support terrorist and criminal activi-
ties. '149 Marcy M. Forman, the director of ICE investigations, testified
to a Senate subcommittee in 2006 that "[o]ur mission is to protect the
American people by combating terrorists and other criminals who cross
the Nation's borders and threaten us here at home." 1" ° In contrast, the
former INS defined its mission as "facilitating the entry of legally admis-
143. Chac6n, supra note 101, at 1853; Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006).
144. INA % 501(1), 241(a)(4)(B); 212(a)(3)(B)(iii).
145. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
146. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(aa).
147. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(bb).
148. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002) (dividing INS into enforcement branch (Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE)) and service branch (Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(CBP))).
149. TRANSACTIONAL REcoRDs ACCESs CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), IMMIGRA-
TION ENFORCEMENT: THE RHETORIC, THE REALITY (2007), http://trac.syr.edu/immi-
gration/reportsI178I (quoting ICE FY 2006 ANNUAL REPORT: PROTECTING NATIONAL
SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY 2 (2007), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/
ice-06ar.pdo.
150. Id. (quoting Federal Strategies to End Border Violence: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security & the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Security, and Citizenship of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 88 (2006)
(prepared statement of Marcy M. Forman, Dir., Office of Investigations, ICE)).
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sible persons into the United States and preventing the unlawful entry
and employment of those ineligible for admission."1 5'
In 2005, immigration and security rhetoric expanded again with the
passage of the REAL ID Act. 15 2 Under this Act, a "terrorist organiza-
tion" now included any "group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in,"
any form of terrorist activity. 153 In short, policymakers broadened the
term "terrorism" to such an extent that the federal government has cre-
ated a virtually unchecked power to detain and remove any noncitizen.
Throughout this muddled overlap of immigration and national security,
noncitizens have very few rights to contest false accusations.
In order to cope with the current perception of insecurity, policy-
makers have scrambled to identify a common, recognizable enemy.
Loyal Americans have no physical, easily identifiable, or distinguishable
characteristics. Therefore, policymakers-whether knowingly or
unknowingly-have used great discretion in defining certain "individuals
or groups as deviant ... [by] excluding some to reinforce the unity of the
rest."' 54 Historian Robert Moore writes that defining such a group rests
on one fundamental assumption: if the deviants assert their power, "they
may subvert a social structure which is founded on the premise of their
impotence."' 5 5 In other words, a majority of society must sense a threat
from some ill-defined minority and believe that without positive action,
the minority will fundamentally change the status quo.
Particularly since September 11, 2001, the greatest threat to Ameri-
can society has been defined as "terrorism." This label, however, does
not identify any distinguishable group. Although it is undeniable that
many terrorist threats fall into several immigration categories, it is also
undeniable that the vast majority of immigration is economic in nature.
Given the increase in severity and complexity of immigration law, proce-
dural safeguards must protect innocent noncitizens from becoming polit-
ical scapegoats.
151. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT FISCAL YEAR 1997, REPORT No. 98-22
(1998), Executive Summary available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/
a9822.htm.
152. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005).
153. Id. § 103(c), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III); INA
212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
154. R.I. MOORE, THE FORMATION OF A PERSECUTING SOCIETY 100 (2d ed.
2007).
155. Id. at 95.
20091
282 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23
IV. POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH IMMIGRATION POLICY REQUIRES
HEIGHTENED PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR NONCITIZENS
These trends in political rhetoric and federal legislation heighten the
need for meaningful legal representation for noncitizens. As the law
becomes increasingly broad, harsh, and un-reviewable, noncitizens have
much more at stake during removal proceedings. Since politicians are
unwilling to temper immigration policy and risk appearing weak on
national security, increased procedural protections must be enforced by
the courts through the U.S. Constitution. Recognizing a categorical
right to appointed counsel under the Fifth Amendment is necessary to
achieve "fundamental fairness" in a system that possesses an increasingly
punitive character.
As stated above, a right to procedural due process is essentially the
right to be heard and judged fairly.'5 6 When the government seeks to
deprive any person-not just a citizen-of life, liberty, or property, the
amount of due process owed must conform to "currently prevailing stan-
dards."' 5 7 Since the 1960s, scholars have argued for a statutory and con-
stitutional right to appointed counsel in deportation/removal
proceedings.1 58 What separates current debate from past debate is the
increase in severity and complexity surrounding immigration law and
policy. Between 2001 and 2006, the number of removal proceedings
increased by 113,477.159 The 1996 IIRIRA legislation nearly tripled the
number of immigration detainees by 2003.160 Such dramatic increases
are due largely in part to the expanding grounds for removal, and
increased enforcement.
As immigration categories-and subsets of immigration catego-
ries-continue to form a murky system of nuanced definitions and pro-
cedural hurdles, the risk of error increases. In a 2004 case, Leocal v.
Ashcroft, the INS placed a legal permanent resident who had lived in the
United States for over twenty-four years in removal proceedings following
a DUI conviction." 6 The government argued that the DUI constituted
a "crime of violence," making the noncitizen an "aggravated felon" and
156. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
157. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
158. See generally Irving A. Appleman, Right to Counsel in Deportation Proceedings,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 130 (1976); Gordon, supra note 54; Margaret H. Taylor, Promot-
ing Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29
CONN. L. REv. 1647, 1660-63 (1997); William Haney, Comment, Deportation and the
Right to Counsel, 11 HARv. INT'L L.J. 177 (1970); Robertson, supra note 9.
159. EOIR 2005 STATISTICAL YEA BOOK, supra note 26, at C4 tbl.4; EOIR
2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 25, at C4 tbl.4.
160. Kerwin, supra note 5, at 3 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE
OF IMMIGR. STATS., 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 148 (2004)).
161. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3-6 (2004).
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subject to expedited removal. 162  In a unanimous decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed, allowing the long-time U.S. resident to remain
with his family in the United States.' 63 In Leocal, the noncitizen
obtained pro bono counsel without which the "issue would never have
been articulated, much less pursued."'
1 64
When politicians sweep up immigration policy under national
security and crime control policy, a disproportionate amount of "inno-
cent" noncitizens are put at risk of deportation. Despite the Department
of Homeland Security's inflated anti-terrorism rhetoric, only twelve indi-
viduals (0.0015% of out 814,073 noncitizens) were charged with terror-
ism claims between 2005 and 2007.165 Furthermore, only 114
individuals (0.014%) were charged under the broader category of
"national security charges" during the same time period. 166 The reality is
that 86.5% of all charges against noncitizens in immigration courts
involve non-security related offenses (e.g., entering the U.S. without
inspection, not having a valid immigrant visa, overstaying a student visa,
etc.).1 6 7 Since immigration courts are not permitted to sentence individ-
uals to prison, the Justice Department brings most security-related cases
in Federal District Court.' 68  According to a March 2006 study pro-
duced by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), only 10-15%
of the resources in ICE's Office of Investigation were being used for
national security purposes. 16 9 Harsh immigration laws passed to safe-
guard the country, therefore, burden primarily economic migrants.
It is also well-researched that immigrants are not more likely to
commit crimes than citizens.17 0 The "no tolerance" policies that have
developed over the past decade, however, place many noncitizens in dan-
ger of deportation. 7 1 On average, noncitizens in immigration courts
found to be "aggravated felons" have lived in the country for at least
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 13.
164. Kerwin, supra note 5, at 2.
165. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS AcCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 149.
166. Id.
167. Id
168. In FY 2004-06, the Department of Justice filed 620 prosecutions against
"international terrorists, domestic terrorists or terrorism financiers." Only 28 of these
620 were referred to the Justice Department by the Department for Homeland Security.
Id.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Recent Immigrants:
Unexpected Implications for Crime and Incarceration i (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 6067, 1997), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6067 (stating
that immigrant men between the ages of eighteen and forty are less likely to be institu-
tionalized than U.S. citizens of the same demographic).
171. Stumpf, supra note 100, at 387-89 (noting that uniformed border patrol
agents resembling police enforcement have drastically increased enforcement efforts over
the past several years).
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fifteen years and have family members who are either U.S. citizens or
legal permanent residents.' 7 2 In 1992, the INS reported that it deported
10,303 noncitizens classified as "aggravated felons." 173 In contrast, the
Department of Homeland Security in 2006 deported 23,065 noncitizens
classified as "aggravated felons." 174  Once a noncitizen is branded an
"aggravated felon," deportation is unstoppable, adjustment of status is
unavailable, detention is mandatory, judicial review is limited, and per-
manent ejection from the United States is guaranteed. 175 In short, a
noncitizen could commit petty larceny as an eighteen-year-old and be
deported twenty years later for violating a condition of residency even
though petty larceny was not an immigration violation at the time it was
committed. 176 The law remains steadfast that such an outcome is not
punishment. Therefore, weak constitutional protections leave indigent
noncitizens without legal representation.
The case-by-case analysis of whether to appoint counsel in removal
proceedings under the Fifth Amendment is based on three factors estab-
lished in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) the interests of the noncitizen, (2) the
effectiveness of appointed counsel in preventing error, and (3) the inter-
ests of the government. 177 First, the interests of noncitizens are often
very high. Many noncitizens immigrated as young children, own prop-
erty in the United States, and have family members who are either U.S.
citizens or legal permanent residents. 178 In addition, some noncitizens
would face physical harm or persecution if forced to return to violent or
unsafe countries. 179 Deportation is, therefore, often analogous to banish-
ment or criminal punishment. 8 ' Second, the availability of counsel is
necessary to prevent error. Competent legal counsel would be familiar
with possible grounds for relief' 8 1 Finally, not only is the government's
interest in maintaining the integrity of removal proceedings vital; provid-
ing fair due process is central to American principles.' 82
Therefore, since the risk of unjust and harsh sanctions runs high in
removal proceedings and it is in the government's interest to process
noncitizens fairly, appointed counsel for the indigent is necessary. Cur-
172. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), NEW DATA





176. Pauw, supra note 75, at 306.
177. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
178. Werlin, supra note 3, at 405.
179. Elizabeth Glazer, Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Asylum Proceedings,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 1157, 1179-80 (1985).
180. Werlin, supra note 3, at 405.
181. Robertson, supra note 9, at 1035-36 (discussing various forms of relief).
182. See supra Part III.
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rent realities have increased the severity of immigration violations to such
an extent that Fifth Amendment "fundamental fairness" requires a cate-
gorical right to appointed counsel.
V. APPOINTED COUNSEL IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS IS EFFICIENT,
MORAL, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
Over the past several years, U.S. immigration law has become
increasingly unforgiving and vengeful. Particularly since September 11,
2001, new legislation has decreased procedural protections in removal
proceedings, increasing the potential for grave injustice.' 8 3 On the other
hand, the world has undergone a drastic transformation since the end of
the Cold War. Perhaps Americans believe potential injustices in immi-
gration proceedings are acceptable in light of current political and eco-
nomic realities. The argument for a categorical right to appointed
counsel under the Fifth Amendment, however, transcends much of the
current substantive immigration debate. Whether or not the laws them-
selves are appropriate or justified is irrelevant to whether or not those
laws should be applied correctly in individual cases. Because a categorical
right to appointed counsel under the Fifth Amendment is pragmatically
sensible, morally necessary, and central to American principles, Congress
and the courts should recognize such a right for indigent noncitizens.
First, a categorical right to appointed counsel at the government's
expense could potentially decrease immigration costs to society.184 By
increasing the number of lawyers throughout the system, immigration
courts could operate more efficiently.' 8 5 In 2004, the BIA published a
three-year "impact assessment" report on its own pro bono project.
186
The BIA reported that extra attorneys helped immigration judges iden-
tify relevant issues through well-written court briefs, increased approval
rates by three to four times those of unrepresented noncitizens, and
improved case efficiency by reducing the time needed to resolve issues.1
8 7
Since legal representation decreases time spent on court proceedings and
noncitizen detention periods-often by decreasing the number of con-
tinuances granted-system costs also decrease.' 88 Furthermore, provid-
ing lawyers for all indigent noncitizens would deter frivolous government
183. Tumlin, supra note 105, at 1193.
184. For a detailed description of three possible models: (1) a public defender-like
system, (2) an immigration representation project model, and (3) a legal orientation/
rights presentation model, see Kerwin, supra note 5, at 13-15.
185. Id. at 1.
186. BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, THE BIA PRO BONO PROJECT IS SUCCESSFUL
(2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/reports/BIAProBonoProjectEvaluation.pdf [hereinaf-
ter PRO BONO PROJECT].
187. Id. at 10-15.
188. Kerwin, supra note 5, at 7.
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claims and large-scale raids conducted for political purposes. Again, this
check would reduce costs.
Second, a right to appointed counsel is morally right. Because of
the severe implications of deportation-banishment from home, family,
work, and property-procedural deficiencies are not simply technical
constitutional issues for lawyers and academics. Such deficiencies have
real-world consequences that often affect society's most vulnerable. The
Catholic Church has addressed many of these issues in its defense of
basic human dignity.189 The Church believes that using security and
economic issues to dehumanize noncitizens-or any human being-
offends Christian love and solidarity.' 9 ° Pope John Paul II wrote that
Americans have a duty to promote solidarity "capable of inspiring timely
initiatives in support of the poor and the outcast, especially refugees
forced to leave their villages and lands in order to flee violence."' 9' Cer-
tainly the Church's "preferential option for the poor" cannot be better
illustrated than by an indigent noncitizen at risk of being unjustly "cast
out" from his or her society.192 The Church believes that to ignore poli-
cies that actively promote structures of sin is morally wrong.
193
Although such ideals could easily be dismissed as philosophical
principles irrelevant to modern society, such statements contain a persua-
sive truth. As Pope John Paul II stated:
It is above all a question of interdependence, sensed as a system
determining relationships in the contemporary world, in its eco-
nomic, cultural, political, and religious elements, and accepted as
a moral category. When interdependence becomes recognized in
this way, the correlative response as a moral and social attitude...
is solidarity. This then is not a feeling of vague compassion or
shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people . . . [but] a
189. Specifically in reference to the United States, the Catholic Church believes
that although "[the] Church is well aware of the problems created by [immigration]," all
people have a "natural right ... to move freely within their own nation and from one
nation to another. Attention must be called to the rights of migrants and their families
and to respect for their human dignity, even in cases of non-legal immigration." POPE
JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION: ECCLESIA IN AMERICA para.
65 (1999).
190. Id. para. 56 (criticizing a "purely economic conception of man"); see also
POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REi SOCIALIS (TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
Populorum Progressio) para. 33 (1987), ("Both peoples and individuals must enjoy the
fundamental equality which is the basis . . . of the right of all to share in the process of
full development.").
191. ECCLESIA IN AMERICA, supra note 189, para. 52.
192. See POPE PAUL VI, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE
CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD para. 1 (1965) ("The joys and the hopes, the griefs
and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way
afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ.").
193. ECCLESIA IN AMERICA, supra note 189, para. 56.
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firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the com-
mon good . . . because we are all really responsible for all.1 94
As the United States becomes increasingly "interdependent" in a
globalized world, the unjust treatment of noncitizens has concrete effects.
Whether or not the current law is justified, statutory categories should
not replace human identities. 9 5 Pope John Paul II stated, "The stronger
and richer nations must have a sense of moral responsibility for the other
nations, so that a real international system may be established which will
rest on the foundation of the equality of all peoples."' 96
Finally, respect for civil liberties and human rights lies at the core of
the U.S. constitutional system. The Constitution's preamble articulates a
comprehensive vision aiming to "establish Justice, insure domestic Tran-
quility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty."' 197 Therefore, any discussion of
national security must include not only protection of physical safety, but
also political and economic rights-"the loss of which could threaten the
fundamental values and vitality of the state. '"'9 8 It has been argued that
the common good or the nation's general welfare is always harmed when
individual human rights are suppressed.' 9 9 Certainly the founding
fathers agreed that equal opportunity-not necessarily equal fulfill-
ment-and the common good ought to dominate popular sentiments
and oppressive factions.20 0 Principles of natural law on which the United
194. SOLLICITUDO, supra note 190, para. 38; see also Matthew 10:40-42; 20:25;
Mark 10:42-45; Luke 22:25-27 (promoting service to God and one's neighbor).
195. Daniel Kanstroom, Legal Lines in Shifting Sand: Immigration Law and
Human Rights in the Wake of September llth, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 4-5 (2005)
(suggesting that traditional immigration categories such as "citizen" versus "noncitizen"
and "criminal" versus "civil" should be replaced with "a more . . . human rights
approach").
196. SOLLICITUDO, supra note 190, para. 39.
197. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
198. AMos A. JORDAN ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 3 (5th ed. 1999).
199. See CONFERENCIA DEL EPISCOPADO MEXICANO & U.S. CONF. OF CATH.
BISHOPS, STRANGERS No LONGER: TOGETHER ON THE JOURNEY OF HOPE: A PAS-
TORAL LETTER CONCERNING MIGRATION FROM THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF MEXICO
AND THE UNITED STATES para. 39 (Jan. 22, 2003), available at http://www.usccb.org/
mrs/stranger.shtml.
200. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., Signet Classic 2003) (1961):
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citi-
zens, equally the friends of public and private faith and of public and personal
liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disre-
garded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided,
not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by
the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.
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States was founded dictate that all human beings-not just citizens-are
created free and equal.2 ° '
If procedural rights can be swept away for some, there is no guaran-
tee they cannot be swept away for others. In 1800, James Madison, the
father of the Bill of Rights, argued to a Congressional Committee that
even though granting immigrants residency was a "favor," such a favor
could not be arbitrarily revoked once granted.2 °2 Madison directly stated
that, "although aliens are not parties to the Constitution, it does not
follow that the Constitution has vested in Congress an absolute power
over [noncitizens]. 2 °3  To threaten the liberty interests of noncitizens
without proper procedural checks allows for tyrannical impulses not eas-
ily contained. National security does not simply mean physical safety.2 °4
In 1886, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]Ilegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing
in that way, namely, by silent approaches, and slight deviations
from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by
adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security
of person and property should be liberally construed.2 °5
As Justice O'Connor warned recently, "It is during our most chal-
lenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due
process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must
preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight
abroad. ' 20 6 Such a statement is not an abstract ideal, but a fundamental
principle of American law. Without a strong principle of due process,
the power of government can overwhelm individual rights, causing
injustice.
CONCLUSION
The current statutory and constitutional right of appointed counsel
for indigent noncitizens is weak. As national security and crime-control
201. The Philosophy ofJohn Locke, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/#LawNat.
202. Report on the Virginia Resolutions at the Session of 1799-1800, in 4 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 515, 526-27 (Philadelphia, J.P. Lippincott
& Co. 1865).
203. Id. at 527.
204. Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a Coordi-
nated National Security Policy, 21 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 425 (2007) (citing Rachel
Kleinfeld Belton, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Competing Definitions of the Rule
of Law 5-6 (Carnegie Papers, Rule of Law Series No. 55, 2005) (identifying five elements
of the rule of law: (1) government adherence to standing laws; (2) protection of lives,
rights, and property; (3) equality before the law; (4) human rights; and (5) efficient pre-
dictable justice)).
205. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
206. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (plurality opinion) (concern-
ing Presidential authority to detain enemy combatants).
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concerns increase, removal proceedings become more and more complex
and punitive. In order to protect innocent noncitizens from getting lost
in the system and possibly losing everything in their life worth living for,
courts must heighten the standards of procedural due process. By estab-
lishing a per se right to appointed counsel, the government decreases the
chance of error at little cost to itself. In fact, the costs may be far greater
in turning a blind eye to injustice.
Like all civilizations, America must prioritize its fears in order to
define what separates it from the rest of the world. American policymak-
ers must decide whether the threat of terrorism outweighs the risks
placed on indigent noncitizens in removal proceedings. The country as a
whole must decide if we are safer by deporting potentially innocent U.S.
residents, or if eroding civil liberty outweighs a possible terrorist attack.
As the Nazi-Concentration-Camp survivor Martin Niem6ller warned:
When the Nazis came for the communists,
I remained silent; I was not a communist.
When they locked up the social democrats,
I remained silent; I was not a social democrat.
When they came for the trade unionists,
I did not speak out; I was not a trade unionist.
When they came for the Jews,
I remained silent; I was not a Jew.
When they came for me,
there was no one left to speak out.2"7
207. Martin Niem6ller, First They Came ... (1976 version). The quotation's
original dating, evolution, and proper ordering remain controversial, though the 1976
version is, at least, an authorized text. See generally Franklin H. Littell, First They Came
for the Jews, CHRISTIAN ETHICS TODAY, Feb. 1, 1997, available at http://www.christian
ethicstoday.com/issue/009/First%2They/2OCame%20for%20the%20Jews%20By°/o20
Franklin%20H%2OLittell_009_29-.htm; Richard John Neuhaus, September 11, Before
and After, FiRST THINGS, Nov. 2001, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article.
php3?id article=2252; Harold Marcuse, Martin Niem6ller's Famous Quotation: "First
They Came for the Communists"-What Did Niemoeller Really Say? Which Groups
Did He Name? In What Order?, http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/niem.
htm.
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